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#### CURRENT ITEMS

### 1. COMMENT ON STALIN'S INTERVIEW WITH ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR

Stalin's granting one of rare interviews to new Argentine Ambassador is first-known top-level Soviet effort to exploit differences between United States and Latin American nations caused by sharp rise economic nationalism and wider acceptance neutralist policies in that area. Stalin's personal attention possibly foreshadows greater interest Latin America, to which Soviet diplomacy has previously given relatively little attention.

Argentina suitable focal point for divisive efforts because of Peron's advocacy neutralism and his efforts substitute Argentine for United States leadership in Western hemisphere.

We intend a briefing in greater depth on Latin America in near future.

## 2. REACTION TO CHANGE OF MISSION OF 7TH FLEET

Foreign reactions to the State of the Union message were specifically reactions to the change in the mission of the 7th Fleet.

In general they followed well-established lines of national policies and were what might have been expected, with the following exceptions.

Australia and New Zealand: Official statements recognize the right of the United States unilaterally to reverse what was originally a unilateral decision, though press comment contains an underlying uneasiness as to its consequences.

Yugoslavia: Government-controlled press expressed dissatisfaction on grounds that it increases possibility Korean war will be extended, enabling Soviet Union to tighten grip on China.

Latin American comment generally applauds the new "clarity" and "decisiveness of United States policy toward China."

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## 3. EDC in FRANCE

Report from Paris that French Socialists will vote against treaty in Parliament and no likelihood of majority for treaty in French Parliament without Socialists.

OCI feels this estimate premature and unwarranted. If a total of 100 Socialists and Gualists either vote for treaty or abstain from voting, treaty will pass. Thirty Socialists have already indicated will vote for it. Guy Mollet, Secretary General of Socialist Party, states he can influence additional 50% of party "within narrow limits." (Total Socialist seats 105, Communist 101, Guallists 85, total National Assembly - 627 seats). Consolidation of Mollet's position, not yet firm, is key to Socialist vote.

### 4. KOREA

- (a) Indications that three Chinese Communist armies which arrived in Korea in September and October replaced veteran armies there. Move represents a rotation and not an overall increase in strength.
  - 1) Enemy strength in Korea is estimated to be:

CCF 795,000 NK 289,000 TOTAL 1,084,000 (up 40,000 in two weeks)

- 2) The T/O of a CCF army (three divisions) is 30,000.
- 3) There are no indications that the enemy intends to launch a major offensive in the immediate future.
- (b) Some of the crews of the approximately 100 IL-28 bombers (twin jet range 725 radius with wing tanks) now stationed in Manchuria may now be ready for combat. The CCAF 8th Division (60 aircraft) should be ready by management of Release 2000/08/30: CIA-RDP80R01443R000100030002-7

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(c) The number of MIG-15's flights observed during January totaled 2,213, the highest figure since March 1952. Forty of these were destroyed against the loss of only two F-86's. This increased ratio (normally about 8 to 1) may result from greater participation by CCAF and NKAF units but not enough experience to judge.

<sup>1)</sup> Prior to September 1952 nearly all missions were believed to have been flown by Soviet pilots, but recently the CCAF has flown the majority of missions. NKAF participation has also increased.

<sup>2)</sup> MIG-15 strength is estimated at about 1000 planes.